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ABSTRACT
This work assesses the role of leverage and of the balance sheet channel in the
performance of the U.S. economy during the Great Depression of 1929-1933. I
use a cross-sectional approach at the state level and measure the impact of farm
and house values and of loan-to-value ratios in personal income, debt, wages,
employment, and the number of banks. The results show that the more
leveraged states experienced sharper contractions. This result gives additional
support to the link between leverage and the business cycle.
JEL Codes: E2, E3, E4, E5, N12, R2
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1. Introduction
The role of over-indebtedness in the household sector appears repeatedly in the
literature about the causes of the Great Recession of 2008-2009. However, it
was only recently that authors came to apply that concept to the study of the
Great Depression. This is a good historical episode to search for such evidence
not only because of the credit expansion during the 1920s, but also because the
debt-to-income ratio has never reached such high levels, except at the onset of
the Great Recession (Mian and Sufi, 2010, p. 1). The aim of this work is to
contribute to the debate on the importance of leverage and balance sheet
distress in explaining deep recessions.
The aggregate U.S. data shows the potential importance of debt in the Great
Depression. Total debt-to-income ratio1 climbed from 148% to 186%, from 1920
to 1929. In 1933 it was 314% due to the abrupt fall in income. The output
components2 that experienced the largest fall in nominal terms, between 1929
and 1933, were the nonfarm and farm residential investment (86.8% and 75.0%,
respectively), and the durables investment and consumption (73.2% and 62.0%,
respectively), which are the categories that mostly rely on debt financing.
Additionally, it was the farm sector that suffered the sharpest fall, decreasing
52.6%. Gjerstad and Smith (2013, p. 10) note that housing investment was the
category that reached a higher growth during the 1920s and a subsequent larger
drop3. Regarding the decrease in nominal debt4, the farm productive and the
1 Nominal GDP fell 46% from 1929 to 1933. Source: Historical Statistics of the United States
Colonial Times to 1970 in tables F1-9 and X393-409.
2 Source: Source: Historical Statistics of the United States Colonial Times to 1970 - tables F1-9,
F36-46.
3 Accordingly, in 1933 housing was 12.5% of its 1929 level and 7.5% of its peak level in 1925.
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consumption credit sectors were the ones that deleveraged the most. They fell
46.2% and 45.1%, in nominal terms, respectively. Also, the data shows that the
years preceding the Depression were characterized by a credit boom particularly
in consumption and nonfarm mortgage. Between 1920 and 1928, consumer and
mortgage credit rose 110.0% and 153%, respectively. On the contrary, the farm
mortgage credit was already falling in that period (3.9%). (See Appendices B
and E)
A closer look to the nonfarm housing market reveals that it was already
distressed when the Depression burst5. The number of new nonfarm dwelling
units rose 332% from 1920 to its peak in 1925. The house prices also peaked in
1925, and both began to fall thereafter. The accumulation of mortgage debt
during the 1920s, combined with the fall in housing prices, led to the increase in
the loan-to-value ratios of households. Accordingly, the ratio of nonfarm
residential mortgage debt to residential wealth rose during the decade, climbing
from 10.2% in 1920 to 27.2% in 1929. Regarding the farm sector6, it was more
levered than the nonfarm: the mortgage debt to farm value ratio climbed from
30.7% to 40.6%, from 1920 to 1925; in 1930 the sector was already deleveraging
as that ratio had fallen to 37.3%; from 1920 to 1930, farm values decreased by
25.2%. (See Appendix C)
This work studies the impact of leverage and of falling farm and house values in
the Great Depression of 1929-1933. As far as I could infer, this work has not yet
been conducted. Gartner (2013) discussed the role of high mortgage debt-to-
4 Source: Historical Statistics of the United States Colonial Times to 1970 in tables X393-409
5 Source: Grebler et al. (1956), Tables B-1, C-1, and L-6
6 Source: Census of Agriculture 1920, 1925, and 1930.
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income ratios on the onset of the Great Depression but did not consider the
leverage relatively to asset values7. Brocker and Hanes (2012) studied the role of
increasing house values, construction, and ownership rates in the 1920s but did
not measure their impact on aggregate macroeconomic variables.
Using a cross-sectional approach, I measure the impact of mortgage debt to
asset value ratio and of farm and house values in personal income, debt, wages,
employment, and the number of banks. The overall results show that the more
leveraged states experienced stronger contractions.
Particularly, I reach four conclusions. First, the states where the mortgage debt
to farm value was greater in the years before the Great Depression, suffered a
larger fall in personal income, wages, and employment. There is also evidence
that higher leverage in the farm sector influenced bank failures and debt
between 1930 and 1933. Second, the states where farm values decreased the
most between 1920 and 1930 saw greater declines in personal income, wages
and employment. Third, using a proxy for leverage, I show that the states where
the number of owned houses was greater in 1930 experienced stronger losses in
personal income and wages; the impact of leverage on personal income is
greater than in the farm sector which is consistent with the fact that the
household mortgage debt represented a higher share of total net debt relatively
to farm mortgage debt. Fourth, the states where the house values dropped the
most between 1920 and 1930 had higher unemployment in the non-
manufacturing sector and deleveraged more between 1930 and 1933.
7 The author uses the ratio of mortgage debt-to-income. Mortgage debt is real estate debt in
commercial and mutual savings banks.
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The results are robust to state-level control variables for productivity, industrial
composition, and monetary policy. Combined with recent literature about the
Great Recession of 2008-2009, the results suggest that leverage and the balance
sheet channel are important components of the explanation of deep recessions
and cannot be neglected by the monetary policy.
The rest of the work is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature
about the role of debt in the Great Depression, focusing the recent
developments in this area of research. Then, in section 3, I discuss my new
dataset and the methodology. Section 4 presents the results for several
estimation equations and discusses the econometric issues. Section 5 concludes
and resumes the main findings.
2. Literature review and the role of debt in the Great Depression
If one concludes that the housing market developments that took place before
the banking panics had a decisive negative impact on the economic
performance, then one must challenge the general explanation of the Great
Depression, given by Friedman and Schwartz (1963). According to the authors,
it was the fact that the Federal Reserve System failed to provide the liquidity
needed to avoid the widespread bank runs that caused the money supply and
consequently income to contract. Their theory is based on the idea of a reserves
gap which led some banks into bankruptcy, while others, struggling to protect
themselves, reduced the credit to the economy. However, this thesis is subject to
two criticisms: the member banks’ reserves balances have only fallen later in the
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Depression in 1931 and 1932; additionally, the reserves of Federal Reserve
Banks did not actually fall. (See Appendix D)
Temin (1976) argued that the monetarist explanation disregards the money
demand and concluded that if the reserves gap of 1930 was so sharp, then it
should have had occurred an interruption in the downward trend of short-term
rates which has not. Instead, Temin believes that the fall in money demand was
caused by an autonomous decrease in consumption. He observed that «the
decline in consumption in 1930 was unusually large» which is «consistent with
the hypothesis that household balance sheets were stressed before the monetary
collapse in 1931» (Gjerstad and Smith, 2013, p. 7). As Field (2013, p. 5) noted, if
the monetary expansion conducted in the recent Great Recession «will not have
avoided the (…) output loss over the years 2008-2017, we must reconsider
whether (…) massive monetary accommodation in 1929-33 would have avoided
most of the output loss».
The study of debt in financial crisis is not a new issue and it was first proposed
by Fischer (1933), who argued that whenever «a state of over-indebtedness
exists, this will tend to lead to liquidation, through the alarm either of debtors or
creditor or both» (Fisher, 1933, p. 341-342). Besides other effects, the
liquidation leads to the fall in the price level, which increases debt in real terms.
Eventually, banks realize that people won’t be able to repay their debt so they
contract the credit to the economy. Hence, the output falls and the price level
drops again, which further increases the real debt burden, reinforcing the debt-
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deflation cycle8. King (1994, p. 442) described it as «a propagation mechanism
which multiplies small shocks into potentially large changes in aggregate
demand and output». Although Fisher’s theory goes back to the 1930s, it was
generally forgotten, and even in the 1930s it «was not well received by the
critics» (King, 1994, p. 428).
It was only after the 1970s when a new financial crisis burst that authors began
to build on Fisher’s theory. Tobin (1980) discussed that debt redistribution
between lenders and borrowers affects the economy and argued that
«aggregation would not matter if (…) marginal propensities to spend from
wealth were the same for creditors and debtors» (Tobin, 1980, p. 10). Since
debtors have a higher marginal propensity to spend, debt service constitutes a
larger share of debtors’ incomes than of creditors’, and the effect on aggregate
demand is not neutral9. Olney (1999, 2012) argued that highly indebted
consumers reduced consumption in order to avoid default. King (1994, p. 419),
notes that «in the early 1990s the most severe recessions occurred in those
countries which had experienced the largest increases in private debt burdens»
before the crisis.
Mishkin (1978) discussed the negative wealth and liquidity effects deriving from
the stock market decline and argued that it affected households’ balance sheets
thus constraining consumption.
8 Fisher believed that the negative cycle could have been avoided by reflation (expansionary
policy in order to bring prices up).
9 This effect is greater than the Pigou effect according to which, during periods of deflation
consumption would rise due to the rise in the real balances of wealth which would stimulate the
output and employment.
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After the Japanese crisis in the 1990s and the Great Recession of 2008-2009,
the issue of over-indebted households has come to the spotlight10. Many authors
have modelled the impact of a credit tightening shock on over-indebted
consumers11. In general they conclude that after the shock, consumers are
forced to deleverage which depresses aggregate demand, and that the economy
is driven into a liquidity trap. In a slightly different approach, Koo (2009)
asserted that the deleveraging process of both the Great Recession and the Great
Depression was a voluntary action by borrowers as they became aware of their
own over-indebtedness. He believes that after the asset prices shock,
households and firms began to pay down their debts, i.e. minimizing debt,
which made both the aggregate demand and the money supply to fall12.
As far as the empirical literature is concerned, Mian et al. (2010, 2011, 2012)
used a cross-sectional analysis to show that the counties where households were
most leveraged prior to the Great Recession, were the ones where the
contraction has been heavier13. Following this literature, and applying it to the
10 See for instance, Chapter 3 of the IMF report (2012), the McKinsey report on Debt and
Deleveraging (2010), and the articles by Glick et al. in FRBSF Economic Letter (2009, 2010).
11 Guerrieri and Lorenzoni (2011) conclude that consumers deleverage by increasing their
savings as a precautionary behaviour. Hall (2011) explains that when economies stuck at the
zero-lower bound markets don´t clear after a shock and the economy will remain below full
employment as long as there is excess durable goods and debt. In Eggertson and Krugman
(2011) households start to deleverage after they became aware that they are highly indebted.
Midrigan and Philippon (2011) show that the regions where leverage was higher on the onset of
the crisis, were the ones where the output and employment decreased the most.
12 The author defends the existence of two types of economy. In the Yang economy, firms
maximize profits and balance sheets are healthy; government intervention can crowd out private
investment; monetary policy is effective because companies have high demand for funding. In
the Yin economy, firms minimize debt and have balance sheet problems due to a fall in asset
prices; companies start to pay down their debts and monetary policy is ineffective because
private-sector demand for funds is small; the government should borrow and spend the savings
that are generated by the private sector because there is no danger of crowding out of private
investment. Koo also asserts that bank reserves didn’t fall and so it cannot explain the fall in the
money supply.
13 Mian and Sufi (2010) showed that the debt-to-income ratio as at 2006 helps to explain both
the timing and severity of the 2007-2009 recession. Mian and Sufi (2012) go further in trying to
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Great Depression, Gartner (2013) presents evidence that the states that had
higher mortgage debt-to-income ratios in 1929 were the ones that experienced a
slowest recovery after 1933.
Despite the recent developments in the literature, the study of mortgage debt in
the Great Depression is still in an early stage, surely because «residential
construction and mortgage credit were poorly measured» (Snowden, 2013, p. 1).
As Snowden (2013) notes, a crucial limitation is the fact that the amount of
home mortgage was taken off the 1930 Census of Population. Therefore, the
loan-to-value ratio of the nonfarm mortgages is not precisely known. After the
foreclosure crisis in the 1930s, the government perceived the lack of information
and, in 1935, conducted the Financial Survey of Urban Housing (FSUH), which
questioned a sample of individuals about the value of their houses and mortgage
in the years of 1930, 1933, and 1934. Despite the survey, the information is still
fragmented, and while for 1920 one can rely in the Population Census which
gathers information at the national level, the FSUH was only conducted in about
50 cities.
Despite these limitations in the data, several authors have been studying the
housing market of the 1920s. An important question on the table is how the
housing market distress could have been transmitted to the economy, especially
in the mortgage credit conditions of the 1920s: mortgages usually required 50%
down payment, were usually of five years maturity, and had low loan-to-value
ratios, thus the sector was much less levered than today (Field, 2013, p. 9).
explain unemployment using the household’s deleveraging process. They conclude that the «job
losses in the non-tradable sector from 2007 to 2009 are significantly higher in high leverage
counties» (p. 2).
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Snowden (2010, p. 7) refers that in 1920 only 41% of nonfarm houses were
owner-occupied, and from those only 40% were mortgaged; additionally,
mortgages «were structured as straight or partially-amortized balloon loans (…)
and were typically renewed one or more times before being fully repaid».
The most accepted view is that the housing cycle may have affected the general
economy through multiplier effects from the fall in the construction sector
which declined by a larger fraction of GDP than nowadays: according to Field
(2013, p. 41), the construction share of GDP fell from 6% in 1925 to 1% in 1933.
However, some authors believe that the wealth effects arising from the declining
house prices and foreclosures could have had major consequences. According to
Gjerstad and Smith (2013), the indicators of a housing crisis were present well
before the first banking crisis14. Specifically, as house prices fell15 and the debt
burden was fixed, households cut on consumption, particularly on durables
which made firms reduce production and consequently, wages and employment
fell. Therefore, households became more distressed and eventually failed to pay
their mortgages which deteriorated banks’ balance sheets thus making them
reduce credit. This theory complements Temin’s belief in an autonomous fall in
consumption, and challenges Friedman and Schwartz (1963) because it implies
an explanation for the fall in the money stock based on the demand rather than
on the supply side. Brocker and Hanes (2012) performed a cross-sectional
14 Residential mortgage debt rose 268% from 1919 to 1929, mainly financed by mortgage bonds
but began to fall in 1929. House sales and prices began to fall after their 1926 peak, and
mortgage bond defaults, mortgage delinquency and foreclosures started to rise before 1929.
15 The fall in housing prices was the result of a Minsky moment: long periods of growth and asset
appreciation induce borrowers to accumulate high levels of debt, beyond their ability to repay.
Once the value of the assets stops increasing, borrowers that had been borrowing against
collateral can no longer do it.
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analysis, and conclude that the cities that were «more affected by the residential
real estate boom16 (…) suffered greater declines in perceived house values and
higher foreclosure rates» (p. 33).
3 Measuring the effects of leverage on the economic performance
between 1929 and 1933
In this section, I explore the wealth channel through which the decrease in
property values and the level of leverage could have impacted on the economic
developments during the Depression. I study the effect of leverage in six
economic indicators, at the state level, using an OLS cross-sectional model. The
objective is to check whether the states with higher leverage and where the
properties’ values decreased the most in the previous years of the Depression
were those that experienced deeper contractions between 1929 and 1933. The
six economic indicators I study are personal income (INC), debt (DEBT), wages
(WAGES), manufacturing and non-manufacturing employment (EMPMAN and
EMPNMAN), and the number of banks within each state (BANK). Except for
employment, variables are computed in per capita terms.
The equations include several control variables, chosen according to the
previous literature, particularly, Gartner (2013), Garret and Wheelock (2006),
and Mian and Sufi (2010). First, I include PCINCs;1929 which is the per capita
income in each state in 1929 because «states that entered the Depression with
relatively low per capita incomes tended to suffer larger percentage declines in
per capita income than did high income states» (Garret and Wheelock, 2006, p.
16 Accordingly, those cities that experienced higher increases in housing units, home values,
homeownership, and mortgage indebtedness.
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1). Second, I include three variables that control for the sectorial composition of
each state, FARMs;1929, MANUFs;1929, and WHOLRETAILs;1929. These variables
account for the sectors that represent the largest shares in personal income and
some of the most affected sectors at national level namely, farm, manufacturing
and wholesale and retail sectors. According to existing literature, there is a
«statistically significant impact of industry structure on state per capita income
growth» (Garret and Wheelock, 2006, p. 16). Finally, I include RESDEPs;1929
which accounts for differences in the monetary policy between states. I use the
reserves in each of the 12 Federal Reserve Banks and I aggregate states in
accordance with the Federal Reserve Board Report of 1933: whenever a state
belongs to two different Federal Districts, it is assigned to the District in which
the larger number of its population is in. In order to make numbers comparable,
I divide by total deposits in each of the 12 geographical areas17. I chose this
variable because Friedman and Schwartz (1963) argued that a reserves gap
restrained the credit availability causing income to collapse. Additionally, total
reserves in 1929 represent very well its future behaviour in the period 1930-33,
for each of the 12 Districts (correlation coefficient of 97.8% between reserves in
1929 and the average reserves in 1930-33). This approach, however, entails one
limitation because it does not include reserves in other banks than the Federal
Reserve Banks. Nevertheless, that data is not available at the state level.
I divide my analysis into two sections. One deals with the farm sector and the
other with the nonfarm sector. Although the farm sector is not usually analysed
when studying the housing boom of the 1920s, my aim is to study the impact of
17 I also performed the estimated equations with the ratio of reserves per capita but the results
do not differ significantly.
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leverage in the economic performance and not the housing boom itself.
Additionally, the farm sector provides instructive evidence for two main
reasons. First it is largely free from the influence of the monetary policy of the
1920s as the value of farm properties was already falling during the decade
because of specific sector problems: during the World War I, U.S. farmers
supplied European countries with farm products; when the European countries
restarted their production, U.S. farmers were left with over-supply, which led to
the fall in farm prices; the fall in farm income, combined with heavy debt
burdens lead to a farm crisis during the 1920s. Second, farm property values fell
in a much higher scale than the nonfarm sector: it is estimated that between
1920 and 1930, the farm property values decreased 25.2%, on average; in a
much less extend, nonfarm house prices declined by 9.7% between the same
years18. Therefore, the balance sheet of the farm sector must have been affected
by wealth effects, before and to a higher extend, than the nonfarm sector.
However in 1929, farm debt represented only 6.4% of total net debt, and the
farm mortgage only 5.0%, while the household mortgage was 16.3% of total net
debt in 192919. Before proceeding into the methodology, in the next section I
discuss the dataset.
3.1 Data description
I have compiled my own dataset which relies in a variety of sources: the Census
of Population, the Census of Agriculture, the Mortgages on Homes, the All
18 Farm and nonfarm properties’ values computed from average data at the state level, from the
Census of Agriculture 1920 and 1930, Mortgages on homes 1920, and Census of Population
1930.
19 Data is from the Historical Statistics of the United States Colonial Times to 1970, series X393-
409.
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Banks Statistics 1896-1955, the Banking and Monetary Statistics 1914-1941, the
State Personal Income, and previous work developed by Wallis (1989). The
dataset contributes to bring together fragmented information at the state level,
about mortgage debt and farm and house values. As it was mentioned above,
information about mortgages in the nonfarm sector in 1930 does not exist.
Therefore, when constructing the dataset I had to search for variables, at the
state level, that could be used as a proxy for the leverage in the household
sector. This task was time consuming because most of the data is not in digital
format.
The dataset includes information for 48 U.S. states plus the District of
Columbia20. For the years between 1929 to 1933, it gathers information at
annual frequency about personal income (INC), wages (WAGES), debt (DEBT),
manufacturing and non-manufacturing employment (EMPMAN and
EMPNMAN), and the number of banks (BANK). Additionally, it includes data
on properties’ values (FARMVAL and HOUSEVAL), the mortgage loan to farm
value (LTVfarm), and owned houses (OWNED) in the years 1920, 1925, and
1930, whenever that data exists. The summary statistics is presented in
Appendix A.
The data for the per capita personal income (PCINC) and wages (WAGES) was
taken from State Personal Income 1929-99 which is an updated version of
Schwartz and Graham (1956). It compiles annual data for personal income and
its disaggregation by industry, at state level, since 1929. Personal income does
not equal GDP. However, between 1929 and 1933, the total personal income per
20 Alaska and Hawaii only became U.S. states in 1959.
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capita has a correlation coefficient of 99.9% with nominal GDP per capita21. This
source also includes disaggregated data for earnings by industry which I have
used to compute the control variables that account for the percentage of
earnings coming from the farm (FARM), manufacturing (MANUF), and
wholesale and retail (WHOLRETAIL) sectors. The data regarding the amount of
loans (DEBT) and number of banks (BANKS) was collected from the All Banks
Statistics 1896-1955 which has annual data for all states. Loans correspond to
the total amount of loans in National and State Commercial Banks, and in
Mutual Savings Banks22. Total loans proxy well the fluctuations in total net debt
outstanding at national level, with a correlation coefficient of 98.5% between
1929 and 193323. This publication has also data on real estate loans for those
two categories of banks; however, before 1934 they are estimated with ratios
based on reported data for 1926 and 1932; also, mortgage loans in commercial
and mutual savings banks were not the only sources of mortgage debt24.
Additionally, this source disaggregates the assets and liabilities into other main
categories particularly investments, cash, deposits, and capital accounts. I use
the data about the deposits to compute the control variable RESDEP. The data
for employment is from Wallis (1989) who constructed three indexes for total,
manufacturing and non-manufacturing employment at state level. The indexes
are calculated from surveys on firms conducted by the Bureau of Labor
Statistics (BLS). The figures for reserves in Federal Reserves Banks were taken
21 Source for GDP per capita is NBER Macrohistory Database.
22 Figures are as of June 30, or nearest available data.
23 Source for net debt is Historical Statistics of the United States Colonial Times to 1970, table
X393-409
24 According to Grebler et al. (1956), table N-3, commercial banks plus mutual savings banks
held 26.0% of nonfarm residential mortgage debt in 1929, and 29.6% in 1933; considering the
data in All Banks Statistics 1896-1955, those percentages are 40% and 39%, respectively.
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from the Banking and Monetary Statistics 1914-1941 which was published by the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System to compile data related to the
operations of the Federal Reserve System. When computing per capita
variables, I have relied on population estimates provided in the State Personal
Income and, on the Census of Population for the year 1920.
The mortgage loan to farm value ratios in 1925 and 1930, and the farm values in
1920 and 1930 were collected from the Census of Agriculture 1920, 1925, and
1930. Farm values include the value of buildings and loans of owned properties.
Regarding the per capita owned houses in 1920 and 1930 in the nonfarm sector,
data was collected from the Census of Population of 1930. As to the nonfarm
house values, I relied in the Mortgages on Homes 1920 and in the Census of
Population of 1930. However, in 1920 it was reported the average house value
for mortgaged properties, whereas in 1930 the Census reports median values for
both mortgaged and non-mortgaged properties. One must also note that the
properties’ values are estimates of the respective owners and not actual sale
prices. Despite the fact that homeowners generally overestimate the value of
their houses, in the post-war era «changes in homeowners’ estimates are
strongly correlated with changes in actual sale prices»25.
3.2 Methodology: farm sector
For the farm sector I define three estimation equations. In the first and second,
I use the mortgage debt to farm value ratio (LTVfarm) as the main explanatory
variable. This ratio measures the extent to which the farm owners with
25 Brocker and Hanes (2012, p. 9)
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mortgage debt where indebted in terms of their property value. First, I use the
ratio as in 1925. The reason is that between 1920 and 1925 farm values had
already decreased by 21.7% despite the increase in mortgages of 12.7%26.
Therefore, there was already in 1925 some distress from the loss in properties’
value. Additionally, I use the LTVfarm ratio as in 1930, which reflects the
leverage condition on the onset of the Depression. Between 1925 and 1930, farm
values decreased an additional 4.5% and mortgages declined 9.7%27. The
estimation equations are the following:
∆ ௦ܻ;ଵଽଶଽଷଷ = ܶܮଵߚ+ߙ ܸ݂ܽ ݉ݎ ௦;ଵଽଶହ ܰܫܥଶܲߚ+ ௦;ଵଽଶଽܥ ௦;ଵଽଶଽܯܴܣܨଷߚ+
௦;ଵଽଶଽܨܷܰܣܯସߚ+ ହܹߚ+ ܴܮܱܪ ௦;ଵଽଶଽܮܫܣܶܧ ܧ଺ܴߚ+ ܧܵܦ ௦ܲ;ଵଽଶଽ
௦ߝ+ (1)
∆ ௦ܻ;ଵଽଷ଴ଷଷ = ܶܮଵߚ+ߙ ܸ݂ܽ ݉ݎ ௦;ଵଽଷ଴ ܰܫܥଶܲߚ+ ௦;ଵଽଶଽܥ ௦;ଵଽଶଽܯܴܣܨଷߚ+
௦;ଵଽଶଽܨܷܰܣܯସߚ+ ହܹߚ+ ܴܮܱܪ ௦;ଵଽଶଽܮܫܣܶܧ ܧ଺ܴߚ+ ܧܵܦ ௦ܲ;ଵଽଶଽ
௦ߝ+ (2)
The error term is assumed to be well behaved, and s stands for state. ∆Ys
represents the change in each of the dependent variables mentioned above;
therefore, each one of the estimation equations is performed for 6 dependent
variables. In equation (2) the dependent variable only accounts for changes
from 1930 to 1933. I exclude the year 1929 because I am interested in measuring
the effects of the LTVfarm ratio in the following years, i.e. the impact that
leverage imposes on future macroeconomic variables.
26 Farm and mortgages values computed from average data at state level, from the Census of
Agriculture 1920 and 1925.
27 Farm and mortgages values computed from average data at state level, from the Census of
Agriculture 1925 and 1930.
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I also conduct a third regression. Brocker and Hanes (2012) state that a fall in
the value of the property affects the owner´s balance sheet. The fall in the asset’s
value leads to «defaults on mortgage debt as homeowners abandon negative-
equity properties or are unable to refinance balloon-payment mortgages» (p. 3).
Additionally, defaults affect the credit supply as it damages lenders’ balance
sheets, and besides that may decrease consumer spending through wealth
effects. Therefore, I estimate the following regression which seeks to analyse if
the decrease in the value of farm properties (FARMVAL) between 1920 and
1930 has had any impact in the economic performance of the later years:
∆ ௦ܻ;ଵଽଷ଴ଷଷ = ௦;ଵଽଶ଴ଷ଴ܮܣܸܯܴܣܨଵߚ+ߙ ܰܫܥଶܲߚ+ ௦;ଵଽଶଽܥ ௦;ଵଽଶଽܯܴܣܨଷߚ+
௦;ଵଽଶଽܨܷܰܣܯସߚ+ ହܹߚ+ ܴܮܱܪ ௦;ଵଽଶଽܮܫܣܶܧ ܧ଺ܴߚ+ ܧܵܦ ௦ܲ;ଵଽଶଽ
௦ߝ+ (3)
3.3 Methodology: nonfarm sector
There is no data on LTV ratios for the household sector, at the state level, for
1925 or 1930. That poses a problem to my analysis and I am forced to change
my methodology. Brocker and Hanes (2012) have concluded that the increase in
ownership rates in the household sector in the 1920s conducted to higher rates
of foreclosure during the 1930s. The increase in ownership in the 1920s may
only have caused higher foreclosure rates through the inability to pay down
mortgage debt. So, the increase in ownership during the 1920s must have been
at least partly financed with mortgage debt. When observing my dataset I find
evidence of that relation: the percentage variation in the per capita number of
houses owned from 1920 to 1930 has a correlation coefficient of 66.9% with the
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variation in real estate bank loans between the same years, in each state.
Although real estate loans in banks do not account for the overall mortgage
loans in the country, they exhibit a correlation of 98.8% with total mortgage
debt between 1920 and 1930, at national level28. This result allows me to assume
that the increase in ownership was largely financed with mortgage debt and
therefore, I use the percentage of per capita owned houses in 1930 as a proxy for
the level of leverage in the housing sector in that year, in each state:
∆ ௦ܻ;ଵଽଷ଴ଷଷ = ଵܱܹߚ+ߙ ௦;ଵଽଷ଴ܦܧܰ ܰܫܥଶܲߚ+ ௦;ଵଽଶଽܥ ௦;ଵଽଶଽܯܴܣܨଷߚ+
௦;ଵଽଶଽܨܷܰܣܯସߚ+ ହܹߚ+ ܴܮܱܪ ௦;ଵଽଶଽܮܫܣܶܧ ܧ଺ܴߚ+ ܧܵܦ ௦ܲ;ଵଽଶଽ
௦ߝ+ (4)
Like in the farm sector, I also estimate the impact of the decrease in the value of
households’ homes between 1920 and 1930 in the economic performance
between 1930 and 1933:
∆ ௦ܻ;ଵଽଷ଴ଷଷ = ܷܱܪଵߚ+ߙ ௦;ଵଽଶ଴ଷ଴ܮܣܸܵܧ ܰܫܥଶܲߚ+ ௦;ଵଽଶଽܥ ௦;ଵଽଶଽܯܴܣܨଷߚ+




A simple graphical analysis shows the potential relation between the LTV ratio
in the farm sector in 1925 and the economic developments during the
28 Real estate loans rose 113.6% from 1920 to 1930 (All Bank Statistics 1896 – 1955). In the same
period, total mortgage loans in the residential sector rose even more 222.6% (Grebler et al.,
1956).
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contraction. There is a negative relation between that ratio in 1925 and the fall
in total personal income in the state (Figure 1). Decomposing the data into
states with high and low LTV29, one can observe that those with higher debt
ratios suffered a deeper fall in all the variables (Figure 2).
Figure 1 – LTV in farm sector 1925 and percentage change in personal income
1929-33
Source: State Personal Income (1999) and Census of Agriculture 1925
Figure 2 – Variation in income, debt, wages, and employment between 1929 and
1933 (1929=100)
Source: State Personal Income (1999), All Bank Statistics 1896 – 1955, Census of Agriculture
1925, and Wallis (1989)
29 States are divided according to percentiles; there are 9 high LTV states which are in the 15%
percentile, while the 8 low are the ones in the bottom 15% percentile. For the unemployment
index presented in Figure 6, District of Columbia is excluded since that Wallis (1989) does not
provide data for it.
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I explore this relation with equation (1) and table I presents the results30. The
regression is estimated with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. The
results confirm the graphical relation presented above. They show that the
higher the indebtedness in the farm sector relatively to the farm value in 1925,
the higher was the fall in per capita income and wages, and in employment,
from 1929 to 1933. On average, 10.0 percentage points increase in the LTVfarm
ratio translates into 3.2 to 8.0 percentage points decrease in per capita income
and wages, and in employment growth rates31. Those coefficients are statistically
significant at least at the 10 per cent level32. Additionally, the expected negative
relation between income and some of the most affected sectors, namely farm
and wholesale and retail, is found and it is statistically significant at 1% level of
confidence. The Federal Bank’s reserves coefficient does not appear to influence
the latter developments on income since that the coefficients are not statistically
significant. However in general they present the expected sign.
30 The Wallis index for employment does not have data on the District of Columbia, and so N is
equal to 48.
31 All the regressions include level variables: for example, per capita income growth between
1929 and 1933 in Alabama is -0.49 and not log (inc33)-log (inc29).
32 Regarding the F-test, the null hypothesis can be rejected for all specifications at a 5% level of




Regression results for mortgage debt to farm value in 1925
Now I proceed to the second estimation for the farm sector and observe if the
LTVfarm ratio in 1930 affects the economic developments in the period from
1930 to 1933. Table II presents the results and this time all the coefficients are
statistically significant at least at a 10% level of confidence, except for the non-
manufacturing employment33. On average, an increase of 10.0 percentage points
in the LTVfarm ratio in 1930 translates into a decrease of 3.4 percentage points
in per capita income growth rate between 1930 and 1933. Additionally, the
deleveraging coefficient is now significant and has a high magnitude. For a 10.0
percentage points increase on LTVfarm in 1930, there is a 10.8 decrease on per
capita leverage in the next years. This is evidence of deleveraging and it is
33 Regarding the F-test, the null hypothesis can be rejected for all specifications at a 5% level of
confidence, except for specification (5). The VIF test does not identify multicollinearity.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆ INCs 1929 33 ∆ DEBTs 1929 33 ∆ WAGEs 1929 33 ∆ EMPMANs 1929 33 ∆ EMPNMANs 1929 33 ∆ BANKs 1929 33
LTVfarms 1925 -0.315* -0.453 -0.382** -0.601** -0.798* -0.553
(0.172) (0.622) (0.155) (0.245) (0.463) (0.577)
PCINCs 1929 -0.000** 0.000* -0.000 -0.000*** 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
FARMs 1929 -0.551*** 0.123 0.075 -0.122 0.422 0.281
(0.118) (0.283) (0.133) (0.186) (0.339) (0.305)
MANUFs 1929 -0.194 0.525 -0.117 0.033 0.813** 0.454
(0.136) (0.427) (0.138) (0.279) (0.339) (0.441)
WHOLRETAILs 1929 -1.230*** -0.838 -0.805** -2.124*** 0.009 -2.310**
(0.349) (0.851) (0.342) (0.431) (0.699) (0.996)
RESDEPs 1929 0.427 -0.868 0.332 0.705 0.242 -0.534
(0.497) (1.260) (0.431) (0.785) (0.990) (1.227)
Constant -0.007 -0.442 -0.166 0.341** 0.140 0.029
Specification OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
N 49 49 49 48 48 49
R
2 0.586 0.293 0.239 0.472 0.230 0.213
Note: standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust.
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statistically significant at a 5% level of confidence. Regarding the impact on
bank failures, for each 10.0 percentage points increase on farm leverage in 1930,
there is a decrease of 11.1 percentage points on the growth rate of per capita
number of banks between 1930 and 1933. At a 5% level of confidence, this is
evidence supporting the fact that high leverage in the farm sector, influenced
bank failures. Wages and employment are also affected by the level of leverage
in 1930, however to a smaller extend. For 10.0 percentage point increase on the
LTVfarm ratio, wages per capita and manufacturing employment decrease an
additional 2.2 and 4.2 percentage points, respectively. The coefficient on
Federal Bank’s reserves is also not statistically significant in this specification.
Table II
Regression results for mortgage debt to farm value in 1930
Before proceeding to the third estimation equation of the farm sector, I conduct
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆ INCs 1930 33 ∆ DEBTs 1930 33 ∆ WAGEs 1930 33 ∆ EMPMANs 1930 33 ∆ EMPNMANs 1930 33 ∆ BANKs 1930 33
LTVfarms 1930 -0.339** -1.083** -0.219* -0.422* -0.271 -1.105**
(0.130) (0.441) (0.115) (0.246) (0.339) (0.514)
PCINCs 1929 -0.000*** 0.000 -0.000 -0.000*** 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
FARMs 1929 -0.426** 0.169 0.003 -0.125 0.249 0.387
(0.184) (0.264) (0.097) (0.177) (0.304) (0.270)
MANUFs 1929 -0.043 0.674 -0.027 0.319 0.649** 0.730
(0.122) (0.436) (0.106) (0.300) (0.306) (0.462)
WHOLRETAILs 1929 -1.279*** -0.406 -0.717*** -1.571*** 0.231 -1.569
(0.276) (0.984) (0.248) (0.466) (0.542) (1.191)
RESDEPs 1929 0.527 -1.468 0.214 0.546 0.224 -0.590
(0.429) (1.036) (0.339) (0.691) (0.910) (1.049)
Constant 0.052 -0.226 -0.171*** 0.251* -0.298 0.119
Specification OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
N 49 49 49 48 48 49
R
2 0.555 0.348 0.275 0.469 0.169 0.254
Note: standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust.
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a simple graphical analysis like it was performed above: I decompose the data
into states with high and low farm value appreciation34. Once again, one can
observe that the states with larger farm value depreciation suffered a deeper fall
particularly in personal income, debt, and employment (Figure 3).
Figure 3 – Variation in income, debt, wages, and employment between 1929 and
1933 (1929=100)
State Personal Income (1999), All Bank Statistics 1896 – 1955, Census of Agriculture 1920 and
1930, and Wallis (1989)
Table III presents the results of the third estimation equation regarding this
impact. The decrease in the farm value is statistically significant at a 5% level of
34 States are divided according to percentiles; there are 8 high farm value appreciation which are
in the 15% percentile, while the 7 low are the ones in the bottom 15% percentile. For the
unemployment index, District of Columbia is excluded since that Wallis (1989) does not provide
data for it.
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confidence in all specifications, except in specifications (2) and (6)35. The results
point towards a decrease of 0.5 to 1.6 percentage points in the dependent
variables, resulting from a decrease of 10.0 percentage points in the farm value
between 1920 and 1930. Therefore, there is evidence that the states where the
loss in the farm value was higher were also the states where income, wages, and
employment fell most. Particularly, the coefficient on income is significant at a
1% level of confidence.
Table III
Regression results for farm value variation between 1920 and 1930
4.2 Nonfarm sector
Like in the farm sector, I conduct a simple graphical analysis to check if there is
35 Regarding the F-test, the null hypothesis can be rejected for all specifications at a 5% level of
confidence, except for specification (6). The VIF test does not identify multicollinearity.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆ INCs 1930 33 ∆ DEBTs 1930 33 ∆ WAGEs 1930 33 ∆ EMPMANs 1930 33 ∆ EMPNMANs 1930 33 ∆ BANKs 1930 33
FARMVALs 1920 30 0.078*** 0.125 0.049** 0.093** 0.157** 0.097
(0.028) (0.079) (0.023) (0.038) (0.063) (0.094)
PCINCs 1929 -0.000*** 0.000 -0.000 -0.000*** 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
FARMs 1929 -0.390** 0.057 0.022 -0.089 0.442 0.217
(0.168) (0.265) (0.109) (0.194) (0.352) (0.320)
MANUFs 1929 -0.137 0.312 -0.089 0.202 0.592** 0.345
(0.118) (0.409) (0.096) (0.250) (0.263) (0.439)
WHOLRETAILs 1929 -1.002*** -0.250 -0.550** -1.250*** 0.951 -1.588
(0.308) (1.097) (0.259) (0.413) (0.656) (1.265)
RESDEPs 1929 0.696 -1.049 0.321 0.752 0.457 -0.191
(0.423) (1.207) (0.328) (0.690) (0.739) (1.294)
Constant -0.102 -0.569** -0.268*** 0.064 -0.528*** -0.194
Specification OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
N 49 49 49 48 48 49
R
2 0.585 0.292 0.302 0.487 0.282 0.180
Note: standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust.
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a potential relation between the percentage of owned homes in each state in
1930 and the economic developments in the following years. This simple
approach reveals that such a relation exists (Figure 4).
Figure 4 – Percentage homes owned in 1930 and percentage change in personal
income 1930-33
Source: State Personal Income (1999) and Census of Population 1930
I then proceed to the respective estimation equation to check if this relation is
robust against the inclusion of the control variables (Table IV). The percentage
of per capita owned houses in 1930 is only statistically significant in
specifications (1) and (3)36. However it is statistically significant at 1% and 5%
levels of confidence, respectively. For an additional 10.0 percentage points
increase on per capita owned houses in 1930, there is a decrease of 10.8 and 5.7
percentage points on the growth rate of per capita income and wages,
respectively, between 1930 and 1933. In this specification, the coefficient of
RESDEP is statistically significant at 10% level of confidence. On average, for an
additional increase of 10.0 percentage points in the reserves-to-deposits ratio,
there is an increase of 7.3 percentage points in per capita income growth
between 1930 and 1933. One must note that the impact on per capita income
and wages is greater in the nonfarm sector. That is consistent with the fact that
36 Regarding the F-test, the null hypothesis can be rejected for all specifications at a 5% level of
confidence, except for specifications (5) and (6). The VIF test does not identify multicollinearity.
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the household mortgage debt represented a higher share of total net debt,
relatively to farm mortgage debt. Therefore, a larger sector must have had a
higher impact on the economic performance.
Table IV
Regression results for percentage of houses owned in 1930
Regarding the impact of the decrease in house values between 1920 and 1930,
figure 5 shows the simple graphical analysis37, and the results of equation (5) are
shown in table V. The variation in the value of houses of the household sector is
statistically significant at 10% and 5% levels of confidence in specifications (2)
and (5), respectively38. On average, 10.0 percentage point’s decrease in the
37 States are divided according to percentiles; there are 8 high house value appreciation states
which are in the 15% percentile. The 9 high house value depreciation states are the ones in the
bottom 15% percentile. For the unemployment index, District of Columbia is excluded since that
Wallis (1989) does not provide data for it.
38 Regarding the F-test, the null hypothesis can be rejected for all specifications at a 10% level of
confidence, except for specification (6). The VIF test does not identify multicollinearity.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆ INCs 1930 33 ∆ DEBTs 1930 33 ∆ WAGEs 1930 33 ∆ EMPMANs 1930 33 ∆ EMPNMANs 1930 33 ∆ BANKs 1930 33
OWNEDs 1930 -1.078*** -0.371 -0.566** -0.624 0.396 -1.051
(0.228) (0.843) (0.263) (0.525) (0.641) (0.909)
PCINCs 1929 -0.000** 0.000 -0.000 -0.000*** 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
FARMs 1929 -0.486*** -0.152 -0.041 -0.229 0.155 0.087
(0.152) (0.244) (0.099) (0.171) (0.326) (0.279)
MANUFs 1929 -0.108 0.274 -0.078 0.202 0.552 0.363
(0.102) (0.421) (0.095) (0.266) (0.333) (0.436)
WHOLRETAILs 1929 -1.171*** -0.876 -0.681*** -1.610*** 0.042 -1.871
(0.259) (0.986) (0.212) (0.417) (0.491) (1.125)
RESDEPs 1929 0.726* -1.132 0.330 0.722 0.253 -0.181
(0.395) (1.248) (0.333) (0.726) (0.945) (1.280)
Constant 0.028 -0.406* -0.191*** 0.195 -0.369* -0.042
Specification OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
N 49 49 49 48 48 49
R
2 0.646 0.255 0.327 0.458 0.165 0.183
Note: standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust.
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house prices between 1920 and 1930, leads to an additional fall in the growth
rate of loans and of non-manufacturing employment of 3.0 and 2.7 percentage
points, respectively. This is evidence that the decrease in house prices led to
deleveraging and to lower employment in some sectors of the economy, and
gives some support for the wealth channel described.
Figure 5 – Variation in income, debt, wages, and employment between 1929 and
1933 (1929=100)
State Personal Income (1999), All Bank Statistics 1896 – 1955, Mortgages on Homes 1920,
Census of Population 1930 and 1930, and Wallis (1989)
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Table V
Regression results for house value variation between 1920 and 1930
4.3 Econometric considerations
4.3.1 Simultaneity
When estimating the impact of LTV ratios, property values, and the percentage
of per capita owned houses on the economic performance of the state, one must
be alert to the fact that those variables are simultaneously determined. The
explanatory variables used, however, refer to previous years relatively to the
dependent variables: while the LTV ratios, property values, and the percentage
of per capita owned houses are for the years between 1920 and 1930, the
independent variables correspond in general to the early 1930s. This type of
estimation helps to overcome the possibility of simultaneity between the
variables since that it is hard to argue that the lagged values in the 1920s were
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆ INCs 1930 33 ∆ DEBTs 1930 33 ∆ WAGEs 1930 33 ∆ EMPMANs 1930 33 ∆ EMPNMANs 1930 33 ∆ BANKs 1930 33
HOUSEVALs 1920 30 0.021 0.296* 0.023 -0.098 0.269** -0.002
(0.049) (0.163) (0.044) (0.106) (0.112) (0.177)
PCINCs 1929 -0.000*** -0.000 -0.000* -0.000*** -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
FARMs 1929 -0.536*** -0.234 -0.070 -0.222 0.092 0.043
(0.167) (0.240) (0.088) (0.160) (0.322) (0.294)
MANUFs 1929 -0.202 -0.132 -0.143 0.344 0.127 0.300
(0.171) (0.426) (0.143) (0.271) (0.255) (0.449)
WHOLRETAILs 1929 -1.497*** -1.549* -0.876*** -1.491*** -0.553 -2.146**
(0.327) (0.913) (0.259) (0.441) (0.516) (1.006)
RESDEPs 1929 0.611 -1.313 0.263 0.697 0.183 -0.283
(0.449) (1.070) (0.362) (0.748) (0.893) (1.247)
Constant 0.013 -0.109 -0.186** 0.056 0.047 -0.080
Specification OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
N 49 49 49 48 48 49
R
2 0.512 0.317 0.229 0.451 0.253 0.157
Note: standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust.
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influenced by shocks in the 1930s.
4.3.2 Omitted variable
One could also argue that the explained and explanatory variables are
influenced by an omitted variable that creates the illusion of correlation
between them. One could argue for instance that it was the monetary expansion
conducted in the 1920s that influenced the housing market bubble, boosting
high levels of leverage, and that the monetary contraction of the 1930s lead to
the Depression. However, controlling for the reserves in Federal Reserve Banks
does not seem to have much impact on the estimation equations. Besides,
regarding farm properties’ values, its collapse during the 1920s was most
certainly the consequence of specific sectorial distress. Additionally, within the
housing sector, White (2009) finds little evidence supporting the fact that the
mortgage interest rates fuelled the housing boom of the 1920s because of the
«very small declines and the lower rates that persisted before the founding of
the Federal Reserve» (p. 28)39. More data is needed to understand what led to
differences in leverage and house prices within the states in the 1920s, in order
to understand the factors behind the differences in economic performance
during the 1930s40.
4.3.3 Spatial correlation
39 However, if one sees stability as easing monetary policy, then the Federal Reserve may have
contributed to the boom. White (2009) also points other potential causes for the housing boom
such as the diffusion of the use of the automobile, the financial innovations and new
intermediaries, and the lack of housing units because of the First World War. These factors
could have affected the house prices and leverage in the states differently.
40 Authors are still discussing the causes of the housing boom of the 1920s. See for instance
White (2009), and Brocker and Hanes (2012). Regarding the Great Recession, Mian and Sufi
(2011) relate the house price increase to the housing supply elasticity in each region. However
this kind of index is not available for the 1920s.
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The economic performance in one state may affect the performance in the
neighbour states, i.e. spatial correlation. If spatial correlation exists, then the
OLS estimators can be inconsistent. Garret and Wheelock (2006) found
evidence «that state income growth was also influenced by the income growth of
its neighbors» (p. 17) during the Great Depression. This may represent a
limitation to the present work and future research on this field should try to
overcome it. However, according to econometric manuals, spatial correlation is
usually ignored:
While standard estimation methods—such as ordinary least squares and
two-stage least squares—can usually be applied in these cases, the
asymptotic theory needs to be altered. (…) spatial correlation is often
ignored in applied work because correcting the problem can be difficult. (…)
If the correlation arises mainly through the explanatory variables (…) then
(…) nothing needs to be done. (…) When the unobservables are correlated
across nearby geographical units, OLS can still have desirable properties—
often unbiasedness, consistency, and asymptotic normality can be
established—but the asymptotic arguments are not nearly as unified as in
the random sampling case, and estimating asymptotic variances becomes
difficult.
In Wooldridge (2002), p.6, p. 134
Accordingly, the work that has been developed on the role of debt at state or
county level, has not taken into account spatial correlation (for example, Mian
et al., 2011; Brocker and Hanes, 2012). Such an assessment would need an
extensive approach beyond the scope of this work, and usually it has been
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conducted in studies that focus the spatial correlation (Heitfield et al., 2010). 
5 Conclusion
This work studies the impact of higher leverage and of higher losses in house
and farm values, during the Great Depression, at the state level. The results
point towards a relation between the level of leverage in the 1920s and the
economic performance in the 1930s for both the farm and the household
sectors. The results are stronger for the farm sector, although the magnitude is
usually smaller. I have studied the impact in six macroeconomic variables and
the main conclusions are as follows.
First, the states where the mortgage debt to farm value was higher in 1930,
suffered a larger fall in personal income, debt, wages, manufacturing and non-
manufacturing employment, and in the number of banks; specifically, 10
percentage points increase in that ratio, translates into an additional decrease of
3.4 p.p., 10.8 p.p., 2.2 p.p., 4.2 p.p., and 11.1 p.p., respectively. Therefore there is
evidence that higher indebtedness in the farm sector led to worst performance
in the macroeconomic variables studies.
Second, the states where farm values dropped the most between 1920 and 1930
experienced deeper declines in personal income, wages and both manufacturing
and non-manufacturing employment; particularly, 10 percentage points
increase in that ratio, translates into an additional decrease of 0.8 p.p., 0.5 p.p.,
0.9 p.p., and 1.6 p.p., respectively. Accordingly, the higher the decrease in
wealth from the decline in farm values, the lower was income, wages, and
employment.
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Third, using the proxy for leverage in the household sector, I show that the
states where the number of owned houses was greater in 1930 went through
sharper losses in personal income and wages; 10 percentage points increase in
that variable, translates into an additional decrease of 10.8 p.p. and 5.7 p.p.,
respectively; the impact of leverage on personal income and wages is greater in
the household sector than in the farm sector. Hence, using this proxy, there is
evidence that higher indebtedness in the household sector led to larger drops in
income and wages.
Fourth, states that experienced the larger decreases in house values between
1920 and 1930 had higher unemployment in the non-manufacturing sector and
reduced debt more between 1930 and 1933; 10 percentage points increase in
that ratio, translates into an additional decrease of 2.7 p.p. and 3.0 p.p.,
respectively. Finally, the higher the decrease in wealth from the decline in house
values, the lower was debt and employment.
The results are consistent with King (1994), Gjerstad and Smith (2013), and
with the findings in Brocker and Hanes (2012). These results coupled with
similar conclusions regarding the Great Recession of 2008-2009, suggest that
monetary policy should be alert to the development of housing bubbles since
that they have the potential to constrain consumption expenditure once the
house values stop increasing. If the aggregate consumption expenditure is
driven downwards because of high leverage households, then the additional
high powered money provided by the monetary authorities is not sufficient to
stimulate demand because households cannot afford additional leverage.
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However, there are some limitations in this work which should be addressed in
later research. First, when measuring the deleveraging between 1929 and 1933,
it was only considered the total deposits in commercial and mutual savings
banks; however the main share of mortgage debt was concentrated in the life
insurance companies, in the Building & Loans Associations, and in the non-
institutional lenders (Snowden, 2010, p. 5); therefore additional data, if and
when available, should be included in this analysis. Second, because of the
inexistence of the mortgage debt to house value ratio in 1930 in the nonfarm
sector, I proxy leverage with the number of owned houses; however, that is
hardly the same and the number of owned houses does not capture the extent to
which households are indebted. Third, house values in 1920 and in 1930 are not
exactly comparable but they are the best information available; as was
mentioned, the values in 1920 reflect the average for mortgaged houses while in
1930 it refers to median values for both mortgaged and non-mortgaged houses;
new estimates about the housing prices can help to unveil the real magnitude of
the impact on the balance sheets41. Fourth, this work does not consider spatial
correlation because it is beyond its scope; additional research should focus in
this particularity in order to confirm if the results hold.
Concluding, the results are consistent with the following description: farmers
and households whose mortgage debt was a higher share of their property value,
i.e. more indebted, before the Great Depression, became constrained when farm
and house values ceased to rise and started to fall. The decrease in wealth,
41 A note should be given in this regard: usually scholarships rely on the house price index
developed by Grebler et al. (1956). However, Fishback and Kollman (2013) claim that it
understates the house price appreciation of the 1920s and overstates the house price recovery in
the 1930s; hence the deterioration of households’ balance sheets could have been greater than
usually considered, and consequently, the impact on consumption could have been larger.
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which was prior to the beginning of the Great Depression, combined with falling
income and prices after 1930, created pressure on their balance sheets.
Consequently, they cut on consumption expenditure, leading firms to cut on
production and employment. Eventually, the distress in farmers and households
balance sheets led to default and foreclosures which contributed to higher
deleveraging in more indebted states.
40
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Appendix A: summary statistics




Dependent variables (per capita, except for employment index)
∆ INCs 1929 33 49 -0.47 -0.68 -0.28 0.07 -0.54 -0.38
∆ DEBTs 1929 33 49 -0.57 -0.88 -0.23 0.15 -0.73 -0.37
∆ WAGEs 1929 33 49 -0.43 -0.52 -0.27 0.05 -0.48 -0.37
∆ EMPMANs 1929 33 48 -0.33 -0.54 -0.04 0.10 -0.42 -0.20
∆ EMPNMANs 1929 33 48 -0.19 -0.56 0.06 0.12 -0.33 -0.04
∆ BANKs 1929 33 49 -0.41 -0.71 -0.05 0.15 -0.56 -0.19
Control variables
PCINCs 1929 49 624.20 266.00 1273.00 237.99 338.00 956.00
FARMs 1929 49 0.15 0.00 0.41 0.10 0.02 0.30
MANUFs 1929 49 0.16 0.02 0.34 0.08 0.05 0.29
WHOLRETAILs 1929 49 0.14 0.08 0.19 0.02 0.12 0.17
RESDEPs 1929 49 0.06 0.04 0.10 0.02 0.04 0.08
Independent variables
LTVfarms 1925 49 0.41 0.26 0.49 0.04 0.36 0.45
LTVfarms 1930 49 0.37 0.23 0.50 0.05 0.31 0.43
OWNEDs 1930 49 0.12 0.06 0.16 0.02 0.09 0.15
FARMVALs 1920 30 49 -0.07 -0.61 0.64 0.33 -0.43 0.30
HOUSEVALs 1920 30 49 -0.12 -0.70 0.30 0.22 -0.37 0.15
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Appendix B: debt-to-income ratio and GDP growth
Debt to GDP ratio, nominal, annual
Source: Historical Statistics of the United States Colonial Times to 1970 in tables F1-9 and
X393-409
GDP growth rate, annual
Source: Historical Statistics of the United States Colonial Times to 1970 in tables F1-9
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Appendix C: Housing starts and house price index
Nonfarm dwelling units started and nominal house price index (22 cities),
1929=100
Source: Grebler et al. (1956), Tables B-1 and C-1
Appendix D: reserves at Federal Reserve Banks and Member Banks
Growth rate of reserves at 12 Federal Reserve Banks and member banks
Source: Banking and Monetary Statistics 1914-1941, Table 87 and 101
47
Appendix E: variation in main categories and sectors of GDP;
variation in debt components
Variation in main categories and sectors of GDP from 1929 to 1933 (no data
prior to 1929 from this source)
Source: Historical Statistics of the United States Colonial Times to 1970 - tables F1-9, F36-46
Variation in debt components
Source: Historical Statistics of the United States Colonial Times to 1970 in tables X393-409
(*) For the period 1920-28, corporate debt includes both short and long term
GDP component
% nominal variation
between 1929 to 1933
% of GDP in 1929
Nonfarm residential investment -86,8% 3,7%
Farm residential investment -75,0% 0,2%
Durables investment -73,2% 5,4%
Durables consumption -62,0% 8,9%
Non durables consumption -40,8% 36,6%







between 1920 to 1928
% variation between 1929
to 1933
Nonfarm - mortgage 153.0% -15.7%
Nonfarm - consumer 110.0% -45.1%
Corporate (long-term)* 49.2% 1.3%
Nonfarm - commercial 11.9% -21.4%
Farm - mortgage -3.9% -19.8%
Farm - production -30.8% -46.2%
Corporate (short-term) na -30.3%
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Appendix F: mortgage loan to farm value ratios, 1925 and 1930; farm
value variation 1920-1930; by states, ordered by largest percentage










Montana 44.7% 6 39.5% 14 -61.5%
South Dakota 42.7% 15 38.6% 21 -59.5%
North Dakota 41.1% 25 38.1% 26 -58.3%
Iowa 49.2% 1 48.5% 2 -48.5%
Mis souri 44.6% 7 45.4% 3 -45.0%
Minnes ota 43.6% 12 44.6% 4 -43.1%
Idaho 45.0% 5 39.1% 19 -42.6%
Il l inois 40.8% 28 43.8% 5 -41.4%
Colorado 42.6% 16 38.4% 22 -39.9%
Nebraska 42.2% 19 38.7% 20 -37.0%
Indiana 39.8% 31 40.2% 9 -36.5%
Oklahoma 39.7% 32 33.6% 37 -33.5%
Wyoming 44.2% 9 33.5% 39 -31.3%
Kentucky 43.3% 13 38.4% 24 -29.0%
Arkans as 40.1% 30 38.2% 25 -28.4%
South Carol ina 40.6% 29 40.1% 10 -28.3%
Georgia 41.8% 21 39.8% 11 -28.2%
Arizona 36.7% 42 31.2% 45 -26.2%
Wis cons in 49.0% 2 50.2% 1 -24.5%
Kansas 39.0% 34 35.4% 33 -24.2%
New Mexico 37.1% 41 30.6% 47 -24.0%
Michigan 42.5% 17 41.5% 8 -19.2%
Tennes see 41.0% 27 38.4% 23 -18.5%
Ohio 43.8% 11 42.9% 6 -13.8%
Texas 35.3% 45 32.7% 41 -8.4%
Utah 44.2% 8 34.8% 34 -2.4%
Mis s is s ippi 41.2% 24 37.2% 29 -0.4%
Vermont 46.4% 3 42.7% 7 1.1%
Louis iana 42.9% 14 38.1% 27 2.5%
Was hington 37.2% 39 32.7% 42 9.6%
Maryland 42.4% 18 39.3% 17 11.4%
Virginia 35.1% 46 31.6% 43 11.5%
Oregon 37.7% 37 34.4% 35 11.7%
New Hamps hire 39.5% 33 36.1% 32 12.0%
Nevada 45.2% 4 39.4% 16 12.1%
New York 41.6% 22 39.2% 18 12.1%
Maine 41.3% 23 33.8% 36 14.2%
Alabama 41.9% 20 39.7% 12 15.0%
Wes t Virginia 35.9% 44 31.1% 46 18.7%
Penns ylvania 41.1% 26 39.5% 15 21.2%
Delaware 43.8% 10 39.7% 13 23.9%
Cal i fornia 33.8% 48 31.2% 44 25.1%
Connecticut 37.6% 38 33.6% 38 25.8%
North Carol ina 36.4% 43 37.2% 30 29.3%
Mass achus etts 37.2% 40 36.1% 31 33.3%
Florida 25.8% 49 27.1% 48 57.9%
New Jersey 38.9% 35 37.2% 28 59.1%
District of Columbia 34.7% 47 23.3% 49 61.0%
Rhode Is land 38.0% 36 33.2% 40 64.3%
49
Appendix G: percentage of per capita owned houses, 1930; house
value variation 1920-1930; by states, ordered by largest percentage
loss in house value
% houses owned per
capita 1930
∆House value 1920-30
New Mexico 12.7% -69.8%







Louis iana 7.9% -34.1%
Wyoming 11.7% -31.9%
Arkans as 9.1% -31.1%
Mis s iss ippi 7.5% -30.9%
Idaho 13.3% -27.7%
North Dakota 11.9% -25.6%
South Dakota 11.9% -25.5%
Virginia 11.2% -24.8%
Texas 9.5% -22.4%
North Carol ina 8.8% -22.3%
Alabama 7.5% -21.9%
Tenness ee 10.3% -19.1%
Iowa 13.8% -16.3%








Minnes ota 13.6% -4.0%
Kentucky 15.1% -3.5%
Michigan 14.2% -2.4%
New Hampshire 13.9% 0.6%
Oregon 16.1% 0.6%
Mis souri 12.6% 3.2%
Ohio 13.7% 3.8%
Was hington 15.6% 5.5%
Penns ylvania 12.4% 7.0%
Connecticut 10.6% 8.6%
New York 9.1% 9.3%
Wis cons in 14.9% 10.6%
Cal i fornia 12.7% 11.7%
Mass achusetts 10.3% 13.8%
Il l inois 11.6% 14.2%
Vermont 14.7% 18.7%
Maryland 12.7% 21.2%
Rhode Is land 9.8% 21.4%
New Jersey 11.6% 21.7%
District of Columbia 9.7% 30.0%
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Appendix H: percentage loss in main variables, per capita, 1929-33,









South Dakota -67.6% -65.7% -37.5% -17.2% -46.5%
North Dakota -60.3% -64.9% -45.6% -20.0% -55.3%
Michigan -56.2% -79.3% -51.6% -31.9% -65.0%
Iowa -56.0% -77.1% -43.3% -22.1% -67.7%
Idaho -54.6% -69.3% -44.6% -28.1% -39.5%
Miss is s ippi -54.4% -64.0% -46.3% -32.5% -33.2%
Il l inois -53.9% -66.4% -50.7% -29.6% -53.9%
Nebraska -53.4% -69.3% -39.0% -23.4% -54.5%
Kansas -52.6% -54.7% -41.7% -15.0% -27.7%
Indiana -51.6% -67.8% -49.5% -33.4% -51.3%
Oklahoma -51.4% -58.8% -47.1% -28.1% -38.2%
Wiscons in -50.5% -61.7% -48.0% -33.4% -59.9%
Ohio -50.0% -61.0% -48.3% -28.1% -40.9%
Arkansas -49.8% -72.3% -42.5% -31.9% -53.4%
Montana -49.8% -68.1% -49.1% -42.5% -39.3%
Washington -49.4% -54.6% -48.6% -30.6% -48.0%
Alabama -48.8% -60.8% -46.9% -27.4% -42.4%
Arizona -48.5% -71.0% -48.5% -55.8% -55.8%
New Mexico -48.3% -67.0% -39.3% -31.0% -32.3%
Minnesota -48.0% -48.0% -40.5% -21.3% -40.1%
Kentucky -47.8% -53.5% -42.4% -19.8% -29.0%
Vermont -46.7% -33.2% -44.6% -18.3% -17.8%
Oregon -46.5% -65.2% -46.3% -21.1% -55.5%
Texas -46.5% -52.6% -41.5% -27.5% -32.7%
Tennessee -46.2% -53.8% -41.6% -26.5% -35.6%
Missouri -46.2% -59.5% -43.2% -22.2% -53.3%
Utah -46.1% -53.1% -45.1% -33.8% -35.8%
Pennsylvania -45.8% -49.8% -45.7% -25.3% -36.3%
New York -45.5% -39.0% -44.5% -14.1% -30.5%
Delaware -45.3% -38.4% -41.7% -16.3% -6.8%
Wyoming -45.0% -47.5% -43.6% -34.3% -28.7%
Louis iana -44.9% -64.7% -39.9% -27.7% -41.1%
Cal i fornia -44.9% -38.8% -40.7% -24.9% -40.6%
Florida -44.3% -78.8% -41.5% -8.2% -48.9%
Colorado -44.2% -62.5% -43.6% -38.0% -49.2%
West Virginia -43.8% -53.5% -42.7% -13.5% -46.9%
Nevada -43.0% -87.9% -44.0% -35.6% -70.5%
Connecticut -42.9% -25.2% -45.1% -23.0% -19.4%
New Jersey -42.9% -45.7% -44.7% -20.3% -31.8%
Georgia -41.3% -51.7% -36.7% -20.2% -28.1%
New Hampshire -39.2% -23.0% -40.0% -14.8% -10.8%
Maryland -39.0% -63.7% -37.5% -16.3% -45.5%
Maine -38.1% -47.0% -36.5% -6.2% -41.0%
Massachusetts -38.1% -31.3% -39.9% -19.5% -14.4%
North Carol ina -37.9% -71.5% -36.0% 1.2% -55.7%
Rhode Is land -35.9% -27.6% -38.7% -16.8% -4.8%
South Carol ina -35.7% -83.0% -29.8% -8.5% -49.7%
Virginia -34.5% -45.0% -32.1% -15.4% -33.7%
District of Columbia -28.4% -58.2% -26.7% na -55.5%
